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I. Introduction
In this book, Tom Koch contends
that contemporary bioethics has been an
"abysmal failure." (6) He sees the purpose
of this work as finding where it all went
wrong, so as to wipe the slate clean and do
it right. Early on, he argues contemporary
bioethics has failed us and should be swept
away because it has not fulfilled its
promise of an undisputed account of human
good in the past half century. This makes
about as much sense as abandoning
modern medical science because it hasn't
found a way to make us live forever yet…
or cured the common cold.
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This book is divided into ten
chapters. Early chapters offer an
abbreviated history of medical ethics, from
Hippocrates to contemporary bioethics,
with a focus on prima facie morally
questionable outcomes. Beginning in the
third chapter, Koch begins to identify
bioethics with a focus on what he believes
is an artificial scarcity of resources. In the
following four chapters he characterizes
bioethics largely as consequentialist ethics,
culminating in chapter seven, after which
he identifies contemporary bioethics with
Peter Singer's utilitarianism. Chapter
eight, on genetic engineering, largely
concerns disagreement and error in
contemporary scientific theories of
evolution and the role our genetics plays in
determining who we are. In chapter nine,
Koch argues that bioethics' focus on
personal autonomy and informed consent is
in error. The final chapter summaries
Koch's argument; he contends that bioethics has failed primarily because it hasn't
kept its promise of a universally accepted theory of human flourishing, but he fails
to offer any substantive alternatives. (250)
III. Review
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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III. Review
Although Koch frames his project as a scathing review of contemporary
bioethics, the primary argument can be seen as a criticism of bioethics done in the
analytic philosophical traditional. He contends most bioethicists are
consequentialists, which he equates sporadically with Peter Singer's utilitarianism.
(197) The central argument in this book is not an attack on bioethics as a whole,
but on what is popularly known as "lifeboat ethics", the elements of bioethics
concerned with ethical distribution of scarce resources. The scarcity of medical
resources, such as organs for transplant, he contends, is an unnatural state. When
taken as a straightforward empirical claim, it is ludicrous; but when understood as
an indictment of bioethics for failing to emphasize a moral imperative to expand the
availability of these resources, the work has merit.
Underscoring this criticism, Koch criticizes the way in which contemporary
bioethics decide how to best distribute limited resources. In chapter three, he
explains that bioethics have historically made decisions off of judgments of fallible
medical experts, but that this has sometimes failed them. As transplant medicine
grew in popularity, doctors – seeking to procure more and better organs – adopted
the term "brain death" to justify the harvesting of the organs of patients without
detectable mental activity. When similar patients awoke from their long comas,
Koch argues that it demonstrated that contemporary bioethicists violated the central
tenant of the Hippocratic oath by doing harm. (63) But this criticism is absurd;
surely Koch does not mean that bioethicists ought to advocate that medical
professionals ignore the judgment of experts and the best available science in
situations of life and death!
This criticism by Koch foreshadows a deficiency in his analysis of
contemporary bioethics that undermines many of the criticisms of consequentialist
bioethics in the later chapters of the book. He never explicitly articulates a
distinction between killing and letting die, but his critique of bioethics consistently
implies the distinction exists; that killing is far worse than letting die. Many
bioethicists, most notably James Rachels, have argued that such a distinction is
illusory, that while in most cases killing is worse than letting die, when all else is
equal they are morally equivalent. This equivalence leads Rachels to conclude that
we have strong moral obligations to help the poor and sick. Consequentialists in
general, and utilitarians in particular similarly draw no such distinction and factor
this into their theory of just resource distribution. The debate over whether killing
and letting die are morally equivalent is at the center of many debates in bioethics,
including both euthanasia and abortion. Many of Koch's criticisms of bioethics in
general stand or fall with this principle, making his overall silence on the issue a
substantial oversight.
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In later chapters, Koch's criticism of bioethicists shifts to consequentialist
bioethics, which he equates with Peter Singer's preferencesatisfaction
utilitarianism. The majority of his arguments are nothing that wouldn't come up
naturally in an introductory ethics course when discussing utilitarianism, and can
hardly be said to apply to contemporary bioethics as a whole. Koch's assault of
Singer's famous, but scarcely adopted, version utilitarianism is strange and
somewhat opportunistic – especially given his earlier criticism that bioethics has
failed to provide us with a universally accepted theory of the good. His critiques
are largely reminiscent of Philippa Foot's famous transplant case, where the
utilitarian is asked whether it is acceptable to kill one to save five; our intuition is
supposed to be "no", offering credence to the theory there is a big difference
between killing and letting die; however were the same utilitarian faced with five
patients in need of a transplant, and one patient she has every reason to believe is
brain dead, she would undoubtedly harvest the organs from that patient to save the
other five; but this result is far more consistent with our intuitions and in opposition
of Koch's.
Koch criticizes bioethics for being too concerned with lifeboat ethics, and for
practicing lifeboat ethics poorly. Although it's not clear either of these criticisms is
applicable to contemporary bioethics as a whole, and there is understandable bias
in medical professionals tasked to save lives every day, outside of these circles our
overwhelming obligation to procure more resources admittedly gets little attention.
However, this is far from proving Koch's conclusion that bioethics is an abysmal
failure.
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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© 2012 William Simkulet

William Simkulet, Applied and Professional Ethics at University of Kansas

Tom Koch sent the following response to the above review. Received December 26,
2012. Published January 17, 2013.

I rarely comment on reviews of my work. Authors should be free to state their case
as well as they can and then let it be judged by others. But William Simkulet's
review of my recent book, Thieves of Virtue, demands a response.
Reviewers need to respond to the work itself and not to the reviewer's
peculiar interests or prejudice. In the main, this reviewer's critique doesn't adhere
to that guideline.
Bill Simkulet is correct in saying I describe bioethics as an abysmal failure.
He is wrong when he states my judgment is based on the failure of bioethics to
enunciate a "human good" that should dominate our thinking in medicine. It hasn't,
but that's not my argument.
My thesis is simply that bioethics promised to provide a "single and
canonical moral vision" that would, as H. Tristram Englehardt Jr.'s put it, "fill the
moral vacuum engendered by the marginalization of traditional medical ethics…"
(H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr. 2011, "Confronting Moral Pluralism in Posttraditional
Western Societies: Bioethics Critically Reassessed," The Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 36:3, 243260.) What we have instead is an ethic mired in moral
pluralism that promotes an economic perspective rather than a philosophically
grounded, moral vision.
It was not, I also argue contra Englehardt that the traditional medical ethic
was inadequate but rather that it opposed an economic agenda whose actualization
required the older ethic's rejection.
Alas, Mr. Simkulet ignores the details of this thesis. It is not, as he suggests
in a bizarre analogy, absurd, senseless, or inappropriate to suggest we must accept
bioethics failure to fulfill its original goals if we are to think clearly about an ethic
that might fulfill them.
I do argue bioethics is an outgrowth of a kind of moral philosophy, analytic,
that has propelled it from the start. This is not open to question, however. It was
the presumed analytic expertise of moral philosophers to address complex issues of
allocation that from the start has been the demidiscipline's raison d'etre. This is
made very clear in Daniel Callahan's recent autobiography. (Daniel Callahan, 2012,
In Search of the Good: A Life in Bioethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).) It is why
students in every bioethics program in North America are required to read moral
philosophy. Simply, it is why we have those trained in philosophy, as apparently
Mr. Simkulet is, commenting as experts on medical ethics and ethical theories.
Mr. Simkulet likes the word "absurd". Thus he takes a long discussion of the
idea of "brain death"clinical and socialand dismisses it as absurd because he
assumes a consequence that is unacceptable. Clearly, he doesn't understand the
argument.
First, I argueas have many othersthat the definition of brain death was in
part a way to encourage organ donation. Then I demonstrate that the science
underlying that definition has been severely compromised. I then argue, with a
number of citations to evidence the point, which decisions are made as if no
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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number of citations to evidence the point, which decisions are made as if no
compromise had occurred. The result is convenient but dishonest, I contend. Here
again I argue the underling thesis that assumptions about scarcity underlie
bioethics. But the whole is framed in a fairly exhaustive review of clinical evidence
and data. I don't ignore the view of physicians and researchers. I actually read the
work in a way that apparently Mr. Simkulet does not.
I am then tasked for not writing at length about the difference between
"killing" and "letting die," a distinction Mr. Simkulet believes is central. The subject
is of sufficient important I debated a chapter on it but decided it was not central to
the book's theme. I included, however, a focus upon the difference between
"worthy" and "worthless" lives within the ethical tradition traced in the book. Here,
for example, is a chapter detailing the famous debate between Harriet McBryde
Johnson and Princeton's Peter Singer.
Mr. Simkulet saysabsolutely incorrectlythat their opposing views are
reminiscent of "Philippa Foot's famous transplant case" framed by him as a
utilitarian bargain. That is absurd. At the least, it bears no relation to my argument,
my analysis or those of either Peter Singerwho Simkulet seems to dismissor
McBryde Johnson.
I wrote Thieves of Virtue to encourage hard thinking about what bioethics is,
what it has been, and about the necessity of its reformation. Certainly its
arguments are open to criticism and debate. But those need to be respectful of
what the book says, not the reviewer's own interests or prejudices irrespective of
the book's.

© 2013 Tom Koch

Prof. Tom Koch (http://kochworks.com), a bioethicist and gerontologist, is
the author of 14 books and over 250 journal articles. He is based in Toronto,
Canada.

William Simkulet sent the following response on January 28, 2103. Published on
February 6, 2013.
Scarcity, the Lifeboat, and Bioethics: A Response to Tom Koch
In Thieves of Virtue: When Bioethics Stole Medicine, Tom Koch contends the field of
bioethics fails to live up to a what he characterizes as a promise found in early
bioethics literature to construct a universally accepted set of moral values.
Bioethics has, in fact, adopted a robust set of values characterized by a respect for
patient autonomy and fair distribution of scarce medical resources. These values,
and their execution, are a matter of debate in contemporary bioethics, but to
declare bioethics a failure because there is not universal consensus is akin to
declaring geography a failure because of the persistence of the Flat Earth Society.
Koch holds bioethics to an unreasonable standard: universal acceptance.
The goal of early bioethics was to restore the public's faith in the medical
community after infamous failures in medical paternalism and what Engelhardt
describes as a "moral vacuum" that arose with moral pluralism. (H. Tristram
Engelhardt, Jr., 2011, "Confronting Moral Pluralism in Post Traditional Western
Societies: Bioethics Critically Reassessed," The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
36:3, 243260; also Bioethics Critically Reconsidered: Having Second Thoughts,
2011, H. Tristram Engelhardt, editor, Springer). A recent poll by Gallup suggests
that contemporary bioethics has largely succeeded in this more modest goal, with
the honesty and ethics of nurses and medical doctors both rated as very high by at
least 70% of those polled. (Honesty/Ethics in Professions, 2012,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honestyethicsprofessions.aspx) A more
reasonable standard by which to judge bioethics is by how successful it has been at
bringing about morally desirable outcomes and curtailing immoral actions by
medical professionals.
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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Here I discuss three related topics in bioethics central to Koch's criticism of
it: scarcity, lifeboat ethics, and whether there is a morally relevant distinction
between killing and letting die. I argue the natural scarcity of medical resources
requires bioethics concern itself with just distribution of scarce resources, or
lifeboat ethics, and that physicians have a strong moral obligation not to let patients
die when they can avoid it at little cost.
I. On Scarcity
One of the central themes of Koch's book is his criticism of bioethics for engaging in
lifeboat ethics, and contends that the scarcity that demands lifeboat ethics is
artificial. Scarcity is natural, he claims, when it occurs in nature and is outside of
anyone's control, but artificial if it is the direct result of actions by persons. Koch
asserts "scarcity is rarely natural", and that the scarcity of healthy organs for
transplant is an artificial scarcity. (101) The primary problem with this claim is
that it is false; it is an uncontroversial and easily verifiable fact that healthy human
organs are naturally scarce; not every human body is born with a healthy heart, for
example. Of course, people contribute to this scarcity through accident, negligence,
and ignorance, but this additional scarcity doesn't make this shortage of organs any
less natural, or any less demanding.
Furthermore, the term "artificial scarcity" is traditionally used to describe
"the scarcity of items even though the technology and production capacity exists to
create an abundance." (accessed 1272013,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_scarcity) It is uncontroversially true that
healthy organs are not artificially scarce in this sense.
Fortunately, advances in organ transplant allow physicians to combat the
natural scarcity of organs by redistributing them from the dead to the dying.
Presumably, Koch means to say that healthy organs are "artificially scarce" because
they are merely artificially valuable  that without human intervention in the form
of organ transplant, organs would only be valuable to their original owners; but this
distinction is inconsistent either of the definitions of artificial scarcity discussed
above, and irrelevant to whether bioethics ought to be concerned with the just
distribution of organs. It is uncontroversially true that there is a scarcity of healthy
organs for transplant, and short of some miraculous medical breakthroughs, this
natural scarcity will persist for the foreseeable future. Thus, bioethics must deal
with the equitable distribution of resources; this is to say that bioethics needs to
engage in lifeboat ethics.
II. On Lifeboat Ethics
Koch distinguishes between two kinds of lifeboat ethics, what he calls "ethics
in the lifeboat" (LBE1 from now on) and "ethics of the lifeboat," (LBE2 from now on)
where the former concerns how to distribute limited resources, and the latter
concerns the question of why there is shortage. (7879) He contends bioethics has
focused on LBE1 to the detriment of LBE2. Koch is right that, metaphorically,
bioethics has spent too little time constructing better lifeboats. Although scarcity of
medical resources may be unavoidable, there are steps that could be taken to
reduce this scarcity and bioethics has largely failed to pursue these steps.
Koch criticizes LBE1, contending that the metaphor "assumes the limits of
the lifeboat are exigent and unavoidable." (78) However, as you read this there
are more patients in need of healthy organs than extra healthy organs to
transplant. Whether this situation was avoidable is a question for LBE2. As for its
exigency, if medical professionals fail to allocate resources, they let people die.
I admit to being puzzled as to why Koch is skeptical about the urgency faced
by physicians. Perhaps the explanation can be found in Koch's treatment of the
case of the William Brown, a famous case concerning actual lifeboats. After this
ship struck an iceberg, half of the passengers we brought aboard a lifeboat,
threatening to capsize it. Rather than risk the lives of all those on the boat, the
crew threw 16 passengers overboard, killing them. (7778, 82110) Koch believes,
but does not argue, that there is a significant moral difference between killing and
letting die, all else being equal. Rather than kill these passengers, then, Koch
might believe the crew should never have brought them aboard the lifeboat in the
first place. When we apply this reasoning to bioethics as a whole, we have a map
for why he might believe LBE1 isn't morally demanding: If we have no moral
obligation to save the lives of the dying, then allocation of resources is optional, not
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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obligatory. However, even if there is a substantial moral distinction between killing
and letting die, certainly it does not follow that medical professionals have no moral
obligation to save lives where there is little or no cost to do so. To do otherwise
would be a moral monster. (James Rachels, 1979, "Killing and Starving to Death",
Philosophy, 54:208, 159171)
III. Killing and Letting Die
In my review of Koch's book, I contend his failure to defend the distinction
between killing and letting die undermines his criticism of bioethics. This failure is
perhaps easiest to see in his criticism of the adoption of the term "brain death."
When faced with the natural scarcity of healthy organs, medical professionals
adopted the term so that they could harvest the organs of donors in irreversible
comas. (5859) Koch argues the adoption of the term was in part an excuse to
harvest healthy organs. The goal, he said, was both humanitarian and economic,
as transplantation was lucrative for the professional. (60) While the exigent need
for organs was certainly the catalyst for the adoption of the term, medical
professionals certainly believed that such patients were already dead. Don
Marquis distinguishes between three theories about what makes something morally
valuable, and wrong to kill: (i) being biologically human, (ii) being psychologically
a person, and (iii) having a possible future of value. (Don Marquis, 1989, "Why
Abortion is Immoral," The Journal of Philosophy, 86:4, 183202) "Brain dead"
bodies apparently satisfy (i), but fail to satisfy either (ii) or (iii). Marquis argues
that (i) is arbitrary and cites its unreasonable implications; for example human
cancer cell cultures are biologically human, but certainly have no right to life.
Medical advancements have made it possible to keep bodies alive,
sometimes indefinitely, despite substantial irreversible damage to the brain.
Before this, the question of whether these bodies were persons was largely
irrelevant as the complete cessation of bodily functions would soon follow.
Following these advancements, although keeping bodies alive was expensive and
wasteful, there wasn't sufficient impetus to change the definition until it became
clear this misclassification threatened the life of potential organ recipients. Patrick
Lee and Germain Grisez present a simple thought experiment to test our intuitions
about brain death; they ask us to imagine it was possible to keep both the head and
body alive after decapitation. Analytically both entities could not be the same
person they were before decapitation. Because human beings are rational animals,
they contend they body isn't even human. ("Patrick Lee, Germain Grisez, 2012,
Total Brain Death: A Reply to Alana Shewmon," Bioethics, 26:5, 275284)
Underscoring Koch's criticism of the adoption of "brain death", he contends
that definition of "brain death" was insufficient, as it misdiagnosed some comas as
irreversible even though these patients later regained consciousness. Koch asks
how the adoption of "brain death" could be ethical if some patients died who would
otherwise have lived. (63) "Certainly it violates the Hippocratic oath's promise to
do no harm," Koch says. In my review, I call this criticism absurd. Here Koch
contends that an unintentional and unforeseen harm violates the Hippocratic oath,
and is concerned exclusively with the consequences, rather than intent, of the
physician. Most surgeries carry with them risks to a patient's health and life, and
many surgeries end in death; on Koch's view any physician who has lost a patient
in during surgery has violated the Hippocratic oath, even if they intended the
surgery to be a success, and had every reason to believe it would be. This is
absurd.
Rather than risk their supply of organs, Koch contends, bioethicists
rationalized their unintentional killing of innocent persons by adopting a form of
utilitarianism where the killing of weak persons was justified for the benefit of
others. (6364) As consequentialists, (some) utilitarians don't draw a distinction
between killing and letting die, so if a physician harvested the organs from one
person, killing her, to save the lives of five others, she is prima facie justified. Of
course this is prima facie morally objectionable. It is also not what occurred in the
misdiagnoses cases Koch agonizes over. In misdiagnoses cases, physicians
believed their patients were dead, and their bodies no longer persons  just like the
headless body from Lee and Grisez's thought experiment. These physicians did not
trade one person's life for the lives of others. In adopting "brain death"
terminology, bioethicists are not taking a stance on whether killing is morally
equivalent to letting die and judging certain people to be less worthy of care than
others; rather they are diagnosis persons as dead despite the fact that parts of
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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their anatomy are still functioning. Fortunately, making such a distinction can lead
to saving the lives of others by allowing doctors to better allocate scarce medical
resources.
The bioethics literature on killing and letting die is not about trading one life
for another, but about whether letting die is as bad as killing. James Rachels
famously argues that if there are the same reasons for a as there are for b, then a
and b are morally equivalent, neither is preferable to the other. (Rachels, 1979)
Rachels contends that, all else being equal, killing and letting die are morally
equivalent. (James Rachels, 1975, "Active and Passive Euthanasia," The New
England Journal of Medicine, 292, 7880; also James Rachels, 2001, "Killing and
Letting Die," Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition, ed. Lawrence Becker and Charlotte
Becker, New York Routledge, vol. 2, 94750.) For example, Rachels argues that, all
else being equal, active euthanasia is morally equivalent to passive euthanasia
because there are the same reasons for and against killing someone as there are
for and against letting them die, all else being equal. Abolishing this distinction is
important because in most cases all else is not equal: passive euthanasia causes
substantially more pain and suffering than active euthanasia. If passive euthanasia
is morally acceptable, then active euthanasia ought to be as well. If active
euthanasia is unacceptable, so too should passive euthanasia be.
Although we have a strong commonsense moral intuition that in most cases
killing is far worse than letting die, this is not inconsistent with their equivalence
when all else is equal, nor does it commit us to a utilitarianism where it is morally
acceptable to kill one patient to save others.
Koch contends that when physicians harvested the organs from a
misdiagnosed patient they have violated their Hippocratic Oath by doing harm. But
if killing and letting die are morally equivalent, then these physicians would be
violating their oath by letting people die as well. By letting these organs go to
waste, as Koch seems to advocate, then all else being equal, a physician would be
as blameworthy for letting her patients die as if she had killed them herself.
Lastly, when discussing the Hippocratic Oath, Koch quotes "First, do no
harm." (27, 58) However, this phrase appears nowhere in the oath itself. A similar
phrase appears in Hippocratic Corpus, requiring that a physician must do good for
her patient and do no harm. (accessed 1272013,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primum_non_nocere) Translations of the Hippocratic
Oath similarly require that physicians act for the good of their patients and to not
harm them (both requirements are found within a single sentence), and does not
seem to prioritize one over the other. (accessed 1272013,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippocratic_Oath, accessed 1272013,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html)
IV. Conclusion
I've argued that many of the central claims found in Thieves of Virtue: When
Bioethics Stole Medicine are false. Koch contends contemporary bioethics an
"abysmal failure" because it fails to live up to a promise found in early writings in
bioethics. (6) Set aside that this is a ridiculous standard by which to judge a
branch of applied ethics, and that for Koch nothing short of universal acceptance of
a normative ethical theory would satisfy this promise; I've argued that bioethics
has largely succeeded in its goal of restoring the public's trust in medical
professionals that had been lost by the beginning of the bioethics movement.
One of Koch's central criticisms of bioethics is that it is too concerned with
LBE1, which assumes a scarcity of resources and a moral urgency with regard to
their distribution. He claims this scarcity is artificial; here I've shown this scarcity
is natural. Remarkably, Koch questions the urgency regarding distribution of scarce
medical resources; here I've argued that even if one believes there is a substantial
moral difference between killing and letting die, physicians have a strong moral
obligation not to let innocent people die if they can easily avoid it without harming
others.
Koch criticizes physicians for harvesting organs from patients misdiagnosed
as brain dead, contending that to do so violates the Hippocratic Oath  a set of
bioethics values  because it violates the rule "First, do no harm", a phrase not
found in the oath but commonly misattributed to it. This standard is absurd; it
would prevent any physician from acting in any way that could possibly harm a
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6733&cn=135
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patient, regardless of whether the physician believes it might. Any risky surgery
would be forbidden, as would breathing the same air as your patient  for fear you
might unwittingly transfer a pathogen to them. Koch characterizes misdiagnoses of
"brain death" as some kind of utilitarian bargain, where physicians are willing to
sacrifice unworthy, weak patients to benefit others. This is far from accurate;
there is always a risk of misdiagnosis, but the Hippocratic Oath requires physicians
act for the good of their patients to the best of their ability. Certainly this involves
acting on the best medical information one has available, despite the relatively low
likelihood of misdiagnosis.
Despite the bluster, factual inaccuracies, and egregious criticisms of
contemporary bioethics, Koch should be praised for drawing attention towards what
he calls the "ethics of the lifeboat." Contemporary bioethics has not done enough to
reduce the natural scarcity of medical resources by advocating for increased blood
and organ donation, nor has it done enough to draw attention to the artificial
scarcity of medical facilities, equipment, and personnel. To do so would not, as he
suggests, eliminate the need for "ethics in the lifeboat", but it would,
metaphorically, put us in a better lifeboat, and actually lead to less death.
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